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INFO RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 2387  
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S E C R E T RIYADH 000728

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DHAHRAN SENDS  
DEPT FOR P, M, CA, DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/OSAC,  
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COMMAND CENTER, INR

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [AMGT](#) [CASC](#) [SA](#)  
SUBJECT: DHAHRAN EAC - 4/12/2008

REF: A. RIYADH 633  
[1](#)B. SANAA 626  
[1](#)C. MANAMA 227  
[1](#)D. RIYADH 362

Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon, reasons 1.4 (d) and (g)

[1](#)1. (U) NOTE: This cable is a retransmission since the original cable did not appear to have been transmitted. END NOTE.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) On April 9, 2008, Consulate General Dhahran convened an Emergency Action Committee meeting to discuss proposals and threats described in REFTELS. In attendance were the Consul General, RSO, RAO, MGTOFF, POLOFF, PAO, and ARSO. The information was then reviewed on April 12, 2008 in light of REFTEL A.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) The EAC initially discussed the recent decision by EAC Sana'a to request ordered departure in light of recent attacks in Yemen. The EAC agreed that the security situation in Yemen was different from the current situation in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia where ConGen Dhahran is based, and determined that current security measures were appropriate.

[1](#)4. (S/NF) The EAC also discussed the recent reporting stream concerning telephonic threats made to a number of Embassies in the region as well as to various agencies in the United States. RSO noted that updated bomb threat report sheets had been distributed to all employees along with instructions on how to use them, and noted that Post had not received any phone calls or threats in relation to REFTEL C to date.

[1](#)5. (S/NF) The EAC then reviewed Riyadh's proposal in REFTEL A for the return of adult family members and children under the age of five to ConGen Dhahran. MGTOFF confirmed that there were currently several Eligible Family Members (EFM) already at Post working in the Consulate and that the proposal would not significantly affect motorpool operations. The EAC also noted that the International Schools Group Dhahran Campus, which is located directly adjacent to ConGen Dhahran, has a nursery available for children under 5, and that the Saudi Aramco Main Camp, located one mile from ConGen Dhahran, also has nursery and pre-school options available to consulate employees. The EAC determined the impact of allowing adult EFMs and children under five back to Post would have a negligible impact on security or management resources, but noted that with a consular region consisting of nearly 14,000 American Citizens, this change could affect the security procedures of American businesses that operate in the Eastern

Province.

¶6. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed the initial proposal in REFTEL D to allow for self-drive of unarmored and Privately Owned Vehicles (POV) at Post. The EAC determined that the proposal concerning POV usage should be reviewed at a later date, but approved the provision allowing for self-drive of armored vehicles between secure compounds. The EAC approved, as proposed in REFTEL D, that employees whose agency provides an armored vehicle should be allowed to self-drive between secured compounds provided strict security guidelines were met.

¶7. (S/NF) These security guidelines include requiring the vehicle to have non-diplomatic "white" license plates and a requirement that the driver have a valid Saudi driver's license and have completed the DSTC-provided OT-610 Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course (or DS-approved equivalent). In addition, drivers would have to follow the strictest guidelines to vary routes and times, and never leave the vehicles unattended in non-secure areas. It was also recommended, though not required, that the vehicles be equipped with a Global Positioning System pre-loaded with maps of the region to facilitate navigation. In essence, drivers would be allowed to self-drive armored vehicles between secure locations - primarily walled residential compounds with host government security - within the greater Dhahran area, in addition to the currently approved exceptions allowing drivers to self-drive POVs to the Aramco Main Camp and to Bahrain from the Consulate Compound.

¶8. (S/NF) Based on the current threat condition, reporting streams, availability of management and security resources, and cooperative security presence of the local government forces, the EAC agrees with Riyadh's proposal in REFTEL A to allow adult EFMs and children under the age of five back to Dhahran. The EAC also approves the proposal to allow self-drive of armored vehicles as described in paragraphs 6 and 7.

¶9. (SBU) Point of contact for this cable is RSO Chris Tremann, 966-3-330-3200 x 3028, tremannce@state.sgov.gov, tremannc@state.gov.

(Approved:KINCANNON)  
GFOELLER